, use the term "gender schema" to refer to an individual's self schema about gender identity, rather than societal beliefs about gender. Bem (1981) emphasizes the link between individuals' gender schemas and their gen? der identity. My use of gender schemas is more similar to Fiske and Taylor (1991) , who argue that schemas organize information and facilitate information processing. Schemas store information about social categories in memory. According to Valian, "the term gender schemas refers to our intuitive hypotheses about the behaviors, traits, and preferences of men and women, boys and girls" (1998, 11). Applied to political candidates, gender schemas mean that voters have intuitive hypotheses about the behavior, traits, and preferences of male and female candidates. See Deaux and Kite (1993), Cross and Markus (1993) , Fiske (1998) , and Deaux and LaFrance(1998).
reotypes (Sapiro 1983; Burrell 1994 11 The distribution of abortion attitudes in this sample is similar to national surveys: 18 percent thought abortion should be outlawed; 46 percent legal only in special cases; and 36 percent legal in all circumstances. Of respondents saying abortion should be outlawed, 45 percent thought a woman would be more likely to take their position, compared to 32 percent saying a man. In contrast, of re? spondents saying abortion should always be legal, 77 percent thought a woman would be more likely to take their position, and only 11 percent said a man. Thus pro-choice respondents were much more likely to prefer a woman on abortion. Why so many pro-life respondents thought a woman would be more likely to take their position is not clear. It may result from the fact that the pro-life movement is predominantly female, or an expectation that a woman would be more sympathetic to preserving life than a man. In addition, being pro-choice is positively correlated with political knowledge, and so pro-life respondents may be less knowledgeable about the abortion stances of female elites. How? ever, it may also be the case that there is a projection effect, since the question asks whether a man or woman would be more likely to take the respondent's position.
12 Women were significantly more likely than men to prefer women on abortion and government spending. There was no gender difference on the change politics as usual stereotype. terviewer gender are coded 1 for woman, 0 for man; race is coded 1 for African American, 0 otherwise; education is coded 1 to 4, ranging from high school or less to graduate education; party identification is coded 1 to 7, from strong Republican to strong Democrat; religious attendance is coded 1 to 5, from attendance at religious services every week to never; abortion is coded 1 to 3, from outlawed to legal in all circumstances; defense spending is coded 1 to 3, from more spending to less spending; government spending is coded 1 to 3, from less spending to more spending; and change politics as usual is coded 1 to 4, from strong disagreement to strong agreement. See the Appendix for descriptive statistics.
151 also tested the interaction between respondent gender and interviewer gender, but these interactions were not statistically significant. 
18
Only 10 percent of the sample gave the same answer across all eight items (e.g., preferring the man or woman across items, or remaining neutral across items).
19Note that I include the seven stereotype measures in these analyses: the trait measure, the three issue competency measures, and the three belief measures. I exclude the baseline preference because it is a vote intention question, not a stereotype measure. My theory is similar to standard models of voting behavior in which assessments of candidate traits and issue positions are causally prior to the vote choice.
20For the seven factor scale, a = .55.1 also grouped the female strengths together (social security, abortion, government spend? ing, and changing politics), a = .33, and the male strengths to? gether (emotional suitability, crime, and foreign affairs), a = .54, and examined the three issue competency measures (a = .31) and the three belief measures (a = .21). Past research has not reached a consensus on how gender stereotypes are interrelated (Deaux and 271 also tested for interactions of the abortion stereotype with respondent gender and the respondent's abortion position. Being pro-life, pro-choice, or a woman did not interact with the abortion stereotype. I also examined the belief and issue competency stereo? types to check for nonlinear effects, since I make the assumption in the model that the effects of these variables are linear. I used an ordered probit model to estimate the effects of these stereotypes on the baseline preference measure, creating two dummy variables for each stereotype measure?prefer man (0,1) and prefer woman (0,1). Most of the effects were indeed linear: preferring a man was negatively related to the baseline preference, and preferring a woman was positively related. However, the government spending measure was nonlinear: preferring a man and preferring a woman relative to being neutral were both positively related to the baseline preference measure, though the effect for preferring a man was not statistically significant. Most of the stereotype effects were also symmetrical. 28 To calculate these predicted probabilities, all variables were set to their means. Table 2 , with only a few exceptions.30 29 Only 14 percent of the sample strongly agreed that most men were more emotionally suited for politics than women. 19 percent agreed but not strongly. This group had a .33 probability of prefer? ring the male candidate; a .42 probability of being neutral; and a .25 probability of preferring the female candidate. 24 percent of the sample disagreed that men were emotionally suited for politics, but not strongly. This group had a .20 probability of preferring the male candidate; a .49 probability of being neutral; and a .30 prob? ability of preferring the female candidate. 30Several variables declined in statistical significance for men, most likely because of the smaller n. The effect of issue compe? tency on foreign affairs on preferring the male candidate became marginally statistically significant (p = .10). The same was true for the effect of issue congruence on abortion on preference for the fe? male candidate (p = .07). Table 4 Preferring change was negatively re? lated to preferring male candidates (see Table 2 
Contrary to my hypothesis, the results in

